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1. Introduction 
Owmership struetun (i.e. the identities of a firm's equity holders and the sizes of their 
positions) is a potentially important element of corporak govcmancc (Denis and McConnell, 
2003). Owaership stmetme relaks to ownenbip of the firm by insiders (owners-cum- 
managm), institutional blockholders and other external shareholders. Various shldies have 
cxamincd the aociation bdween ownership structure, and firm pcrfmance, corporate 
disclosure, earnings management and executive wmpensation. For example, Koh (2003) and 
Chmg ct al. (2002) show that long-tenn oriented institutional shareholdm can act as a 
complementary corporate governance mechanism in constraining earnings management, 
whilst Warfield et al. (1995) daumcnt a negative relationship bctween managerial ownership 
and earnings management. Hartzcll and Statks (2003) examine the monitoring mlc of 
lnslitutional shareholdas in executive wmpensation and provide evidence that institutional 
shareholders mitigate a c s s  erccutivc pay. In thc contnrt of corporate disclosure. Eng and 
Mak (2003) show that lower managerial o-hip and significant government ownership are 
associated with increased disclosure, whilst Chau and Gray (2002) dacument that outside 
ownmhip is positively aweiated with voluntary disclosures. Studies on ownership structure 
and finn value generally show a cunilinear relationship h e d  on managerial ownership i.c. 
firm value rises as mwagerial ownmhip increases over a c m i n  range, but dmps at higher 
levd of owneship (Mordt et al.. 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Craswell eta]., 1997; 
Short and Keauy, 1999). This phenomenon is associated with the trade-off between the 
alignment and cnuexhment e l k s .  
This study extends the literature on ownership structure by examining whether it influences 
the early adoption of accounting standard. This is in rcsponse to rcceot call for r m c h r n  to 
focus on how o m h i p  s t r u m  shape accounting policies in emaging mark& and 
transition economies (Fan 'an Won& 2002, p. 404). The accounting stwdard chosen is 
Malaysian Acunmting Standards Board (MASB) 22 on segment reporting which replaced the 
original lnfcmational Accounting Standard 14. Early adoption of MASB 22 is akin to 
providing additional segment disclosures on a voluntary basis. Wan-Hussin et al. (2003a.b) 
identify more than 30 early adopters of MASB 22 and sbow that the prqmlion of affiliated 
outside directors (or gray directors) and firm size have moderatc relatiomhip with thc 
decision to adopt MASB 22 prior to iu  dective date. This study extends Wan-Hursin el al. 
(2003b) by investigating whether ownership stnvture has incremental explanatory power on 
the early adoption decision. Previous smdy that is similar to o m  is h n g  and Horwitz 
(2004). They sbow that in Hong Kong (i) concentrated board ownenhip rcduces vollmtary 
segment disclosum and (ii) for fm with diluted board ownership, non-executive directors 
enhance vohmtary segment disclosure. 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
Agency problems arise from separation of corporate ownership from corporate management 
whereby shareholders who invest in the busmess do not in& to play an active role in its 
management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). They designate firm m a n a p  to nm the company 
with the goal of mmimiziig shareholder wealth. This can lead to conflicts of interest 
situatim wbmby managers, as agent for owners, may take actions vhich are not in the 
interest of omen .  Thus, the agency costs for h s  managed by ncm-ownen are higher than 
owner-managed firms. The agency costs are related to management's incentive a adapt 
investment and financing decisions that are disproportionakly more beneficial to them, 
management's shirking and perquisite consumption. Ang el al. (1999) and Singh and 
Davtdson (2003) provide direct evidence that agency m t s ,  measured in Lennr of asset 
utilization and operating expenses, are higher for outsider managed C i s  than T i  that are 
managed by owom (insiders) themselves. 
Several mechanisms are available to Limit the shareholder-manager agency problems and help 
align the interests of the shareholders and management. These include having an effective 
board (such as representation from outside directon and Chairman of the board and the CEO 
not being the same person) to manilor and discipline management on behalf of shareholders. 
optimal management compensation contracts and takeover market. 
Agency theory prediets that investors' information requirements increase with the agency 
e a t s  of the firm. Jmsen and Meckling (1976) and Chow and Wong-Roren (1987) argue that 
volmtary disclosure provides a mechanism to lower agency costs which arise from 
eonilicting inkrests between management and owners. Studies on the relationship behueen 
owomhip strwtuc and the exlent of disclosure have examined various aspects of ownership 
srmeture such ar managerial ownership (Ayrec, 1986; Ruland et al., 1990; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Lcv~ng and Horwie, 2004) aod family-conbolled firms (Ho and Wong, 2001; Chau and 
GIay, 2002). 
The discussion that follows presenls theoretical arguments on the iduencc of ownmhip 
suucnue on the extent of disclosure and empmeal evidence to date. Ownership simctue is 
eategorised into munagerial ownership, family ownership and institutional ownership. 
2.1 Managerial Ownenhip 
Agency theory predicts that when munagerial ownership is low, there is grcam agency 
problem because manager has incentives to consume p k s  and reduced incentives to 
maximise job performance. lensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the mle of outside 
shareholders is to increase monitoring of manager's behavia to reduce the agemcy problem. 
It is suggested that the monitoring by outside shareholdm may be reduced if managers can 
provide voluntaty disclasure. In other wads, having greater disclosure is a substiblte for 
outside monitoring. Hence, it is expected that the relationship between managerial ownership 
and early adoption of MASB 22 (which leads to greater information disclosure) is oegative. 
The results of empirical studies are generally supportive of a negative relationship between 
managerial ownmhip and the extent of vohmtary disclosure (Ruland a al., 1990; Eng and 
Mak, 2003; LRmg and Horwitz, 2004). Ayns (1986) provides evidence that firms that adopt 
SFAS 52 early have a lower percentage of stock owned by d i m o n  and off~cers. 
HI: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between managerial 
ownenhip and early adoption of MASB 22. 
2.2 Family Olmnenhtp 
Gray et al. (1988) secrecy hypothesis argues that where a firm's shares are held by family- 
controlled firms, there is a p r e f m c e  for confidentiality and restriction of disclosure of 
information about the business only to those who are closely l i e d  with its m w a g w n t  and 
family. Chau and Gray (2002) argue that familycontrulled f m s  have titlle motivation to 
disclose information in excess of mandatory requirements because the demand for public 
disclosun is relatively weak. Thcy find that the level of information disclosure is likely to be 
less in family-controlled cornpanics, mnsistent with Ho and Wong (2001). Chen and Jaggi 
(2001) show the positive effect of independent directors on disclosurr is weaker for family- 
conlmlled firms than non family-controlled firms. Thug it is expected that the trmparency 
and information disclosure levels would be lower for family-controlled firms. 
H2: Celeris paribus, there is a negative association between family ownenhip 
and w l y  adoption of MASB 22. 
2 3  Imtimtio~I Ownership 
Jnstitufiooal investors have the incentives Lo collect information and monitor management, 
chur they are able to dcmand greater caporate transparency and constrain earnings 
management Using Singapom data, Yeo et al. (2002) show that external blocLholdcn play a 
significmt monitoring role and reduce the opponunities for earnings management. Other 
studied by Chung et al. (2002), Jung and Kwon (2002) and Koh (2003) also provide evidence 
that institutional investors monitor and constrain the self-serving behaviour of managers in 
the US, Korea and Australia respectively. Based on the above discusion, the relationshrp 
between institutional ownership and early adoption of MASB 22 is expeckd to be positive 
and thus we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H3: Celeris panbus, then is a positive association between institutional 
ownership and early adoption of MASB 22. 
3.1 Data Collection 
This study ws the same sample as in Wan-Hussin et al. (2003b) amptising 32 early 
adopters of MASB 22 and 32 non-early adopters matched by board of exchange, U S E  
sectoral classificaticm, iinaneial year end and number of business segments. 
For all the sample companies, we hand collcct information from the annual repom relatmg to 
board composition (size of board, number of family members on board, number of 
executives, number of non-executives comprising independent directoo (INED) and gray 
directors i.e. non-independent non-cxecutive directors WINED)), board leadmhii and 
auditor. The number of business and gwgraphical segments for sample companies are 
obtained from the segment disclosures in the notes to the financial statements. Financial data 
such as total s e t s ,  total liabilities, profit before tax are taken from the USE-RIS 
(hno:/hw.klse-ris.com.m~. In addition, we also gather information from the annual 
reports relating to ownenhip structure such as the number of sham (direct and indirect) held 
by CEOlmanaging dircetor and chairman, family members and top four institutional 
shareholders. 
3.2 Testing Early Adoption of MASB 22 and Ownership Structure 
Similar to Wan-Hussin et al. (ZOO3b). two logistic regression models @inary and 
multinomial) are used to test for the association between ownership s t r u n n c  and early 
adoption of MASB 22. In the binary model, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable 
which take the value of either I (early adopter) or 0 (nm-early adopter) and in the 
multinomial model the dependent variable is t r i cho tom~~ and takes the value of0 (full early 
adopter), 1 (partial early adopter) and 2 (non-early adopter). The independent variables of 
interest are the various measures of ownership such as equity ownership by top management 
and institutional investors and proportion of family members on board We also include 
contml variables that have been found significant or used in previous disclosure studies such 
as board characteristics. firm size, leverage, rehtm on assets and audit firm size (Chow and 
Wong-Bomn, 1986; Ahmed and Nicholls. 1994; Ahmed and Couliis. 1999; Chen and Jaggi. 
2000; Eng and Mak, 2003). Thus the association betwcen early adoption and corporate 
ownership is modeled as follows: 
EARLY =/(Ownenhip variables, Contml variables) 
where EARLY = binary variabk taking the value of either 1 (early adoptex) or 0 (non-early 
adopter), or trichotomous variable laking lhe value of either 0 (full early adopter), I (partial 
early adopter) or 2 (non-early adopter). The explanatory ownership variabls are CEO equity 
ownership (CEOOWN), top four institutional equity ownership (TOWINST) and proporlion 
of family members on board (FAMBOARD). The control variables are proponions of 
independent (WED) and gray directors (?WED), duality dummy (wherc DUALITY=I if 
positions of chairman and CEO are vested in the same person or family members), natural log 
of total assets (WASSET), fum leverage (LEVERAGE). retum on assets (ROA) and audit 
fim size (AUDIT). 
4. Results 
4.1 Snmpk CbnrsetcrisCia 
A summary of lhe characteristics of sample companies is reported in Table I. Panel A shows 
the characteristic of m p l e  by board of exchange. Twenty-two (68.75%) early adopters are 
from Ihc Main Board and the other 10 (31 25%) are from the Second Board. Wilh respect lo 
sector, nearly 70 percent of the sample companies come from four s&ton namely 
construction, consumer products indushial products and plantation. Panels C end D display 
information on number of business rgments and geopphical segments. The early adopters 
have, on average, four buiness segments and 70 percent of them have not more than two 
geographical segments. Panel E shows that 20 early adopters adopted MASB 22 for their 
financial yean ended on or before 31 Dccember 2Wl while another 12 adopted for financial 
years ended between 3 1 January 2002 and before 3 1 Decemhn 2002. 
The "Big 4" audits b e e  quarter of early adopters. It is coincidental that the proportions of 
Big 4 auditor among the nmearly adopters are identical to early adopters. In terms of board 
leadership, about 34 perceiit of the sample companies have duality board leadership struchae 
when the same person holds both the CEO and chairman mks  or same fsmily members are 
both CEO and chairman. Forty percent of the sample companies have executive chairmen. 
Panel I highlights that 57 (78) pacent of the sample companies have at least 30 (10) percent 
family ownership. Panel J indicates that almost half of the sample companies have at least 10 
percent equity ownership held by the top four instihmonal investors. 
4.2 Unlvarlete Analpis 
Table 2 gives the descn'ptive statistics of continuous independent variables included in the 
study, partitioned by full early adoptm, partial early adopters and non-carly adopters. The 
firm size for full early adopters is about five times larger than the orher subgroupq where as 
partial early adopters have the smallest firm size. Comparatively, the board size and 
independent non-executive d i d o n  are almost similar among full, partial and non-early 
adopters. The average board size of eight and the minimum proportion of independent 
directos which is I g s  than one-third are idenlical to the fmdings kom KLSYPWC Corporate 
Governwce Survey 2002. The average board size of eight and the minimum proportion of 
independent directom which is less than me-third are identical to the findings from 
KLSUPWC Corporate Governance Survey 2002. The pmportion of pray directon or non- 
independent non-cxecutives are highest for hrll adopten, followed by pafiial and non-early 
adopters. 
As for ownenhip shuchrre, the full adopters group has the highest average equity ownership 
held by CEO, chairman and top four institutional investors, although then: are m significant 
differences in the ownmhip srmcture among thc three groups. As for fmancial indicators, the 
full adopters grogup has thc highest return on assets and lowest levcrage. To summarize the 
rmivariate analysis, there are significant differences between the full adopters and nonearly 
adopters in (erms of fm size, gray directon, retum on a s &  and leverage. 
4.3 Multivariate Andysis 
The Pearson correlations between the continuous variables are shown in Table 3. Family 
contmlled companies are associaLed with lower proportian of non executive dirrctors, higher 
CEO oumership, lower insritutio~l ownership and smaller size. Finns with higher 
proparion of gray directors, that separate the roles of CEO and c h i  wd  with lower 
levcrage have better return on assets. It is also worth nolingthat firms with higher equity 
ownership held by CEO tend to have mom debt and higher institutional investors 
atsociated with larger firm. None of the correlation coefficients among the independfnt 
variables are highly significant at I percmr levcl. 
Table 4 presents parameter estimates of binomial and multinomial models with 
corresponding edcicnt values and standard arm. For the binomial regression (model I), 
positive sign on a parameter indicales that an ioc~case in thc comsponding variable increascs 
the likelihood of early adoption and o ncgativc sign indicates the opposite. For the 
multinomial rcgresion (model 2), the parameters are interpreted as indicating the probability 
of an cvcnf either heing a full adopta or partial adopter, relative to the probability of bcing 
non-early adopter. 
The results show that model I has a Likelihood ratio of 77.33 with 10 degree of freedom. The 
Nagelkerke R2 of 0.217 indicates mild relationship between dependent variable and 
independent variabla. In addition the Hosmer and Lemcshow goodness of fit gives a chi- 
square of 12.25 (level of significance is 0.14) whieh indicates a good model fit between the 
actual and predicted valuc of the depcndcnt variable. The percenlagc of correct classification 
for model I is 73.4 p e m L  The result reveals that only non-independent noncxeculives 
(NINED) is significant at I0 pment level with positive direction. This suggests that the 
higher the proporlion of gray dkcmrs on the board the higher the likelihocd to early adopt 
MASB 22. 
For model 2, the likelihood ratio is 97.19 with 20 degree of freedom and significant at five 
pemnt level. When early adopters are partitioned into full adopten and partial adopters, thc 
strength of the relationship as indicated by Ihe Nagelkerke R2 is hi* than model I.  Thu 
the multinomial model has a better explanatory power than the binary model that beats full 
and partial early adopten as homogeneous group. For full adopters, variables NINED, 
FAMBOARD, TOP41NST and LNASSFT are found to be significant with positive direction. 
This suggests that gray directom, family controlled fin= firms with large instimtional 
investors and larger firms am more likely to early adopt MASB 22 fully prior to the 
mandatory date. 
However, for parlial adopters, only LNASSET is found to be significant at 10 percent level 
but having negative direction. This suggesls that smaller firms tcnd to make parthl disclosure 
of segment information in accordance with MASB 22 as oppased to delaying the adoption of 
MASB 22 until its effective date. However. in the binary model there is no evidence that 
firm size is an important charactRimc that distinguishes betarcen f i m  that elect early 
adoption versus defer adoption until the mandatory date. Thur, the model that pools full and 
partial early a d o p  as homogeneous is probably misp . f ied  and yields spurious result that 
o h m s  the effect of h size. The evidence whieh shows that m a l I a  companies are more 
likely to adopt MASB 22 ahead of the mandated period, albeit with less than full primary 
segment disclosure, than delay adoption suggests there is a possibility that the decision to 
adopt early is a charade to create a positive impression 
Compared to a previous smdy by Wan-Hussin et al. (2003b), the inclusion of ownership 
variables improves the explanatory power of the MASB22 early adoption model. The 
Nagellrake RZ and McFadden R' increase from 0.33 to 0.49 and 0.17 to 0.27 respectively. 
5. Canclusmn 
This study is motivated by the clarion d l  that researchers invgtigate whether "ownmhip 
structure shape accounting policies in emerging markets and transition economies". Whilst 
previous studies on ownenhip shucture and accounting choice examine a narrow aspect of 
ownership smcture, h i s  study invest~gates ownership shucturc in a b d m  context by 
incorporating managerial, institutional and family ownership (proxied by propoaion of 
family nlemben on board). Treanng full and partial early adoplas as homogeneous, our 
findings indicate that early adoplers have significantly higher proportion of gray directors 
than non-early adopters. l h c  evidcncc suggests that nun-independent non-execulive directors 
do play an important role in accounting disclosure. This echoes the view expressed in The 
Economist (March, 2004) that shareholders might feel lhcy wcre bcmg betler served by the 
non-indcpcndent non-execulives rather than independent directors. Further analysis shows 
that full early adopters an: significantly largcr (in terms of lolal assets) than n o n a r l y  
adopters. However, when comparing between partial early adopters and non-early adopters, 
the cvidence suggesk hat parrial early adopters are significantly smaller in size than non- 
early ad0plers.A~ for corporate ownership. the cvidcnce indicates hat  the higher the 
proption of institutional investors, the greater the likelihood that fum makes greater 
disclosure through early adoption oiMASB 22, consistent with our hypothesis. However, the 
finding that family-controlled companies tend lo also make greater voluntary segment 
disclosure is at odd with the theoretical prediction. The lack of statistically significant result 
for the managerial ownership variable could be due to model misspecification. Perhaps a 
piecewise linear spaification is more appropriate for the variable manage-rial ownership 
given the trade-off between he alignment and entrenchment effects. 
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